Strikes, injunctions and compliance orders: the Labour Relations Act 1987 by Greenslade, Bevan
New Zealand journal of industrial relations, 1988 , 13, 63· 77 
Strikes, injunctions and compliance 
orders: the Labour Rel.ation;s Act 1987 
* Bevan Greenslade 
The paper begins by criticising aspects of recent articles which are taken as indicative of 
views other than of employers, on economic torts and the Labour Court. In particular, it 
.r.espectfully doubts the propriety of Richardson,J's dissenting views in the Baking Trades 
case, and the correctness of .the learned Judge's re-statement of the common thesis that 
industrial relations is a unique civil relationship which necessarily demands a separate 
labour jurisdiction. It then discusses some problems appearing in .the first few month's 
.application of the 1987 Act, particularly regarding remedies against strikes lvith 
simultaneous and multiple causes. The paper closes with an argument that striking is 
,totally owdated. 
The August 1987 issue of the N.ew Zealand journal of industrial relations contained a 
series of valuable articles which deserv·e to be kept with the New Zealand Law Society 
"trav~elling roads how" seminar on the Labour Relations Act 1987. However, they read 
with a certain consistency of attitude which sits uncom~ortably with e.mployers. 
Consequently, this first part of this paper seeks to provide critical, but respectful, 
comment from an employer viewpoint on each of the journal articles in tum. 
Sir Ivor Richardson - 'The role of the courts 1 
Many ~employers disagree with some of His Honour's comments. The following explains 
why.. 
~he continuing relationship" 
His Honour emphasises the 11Continuing relationship" as crucial to "the employment of 
labour", in contrast with the "adversary method of conflict resolution [in] ... courts of 
general jurisdiction" which "'focuses on the dispute itself rather t.han the continuing 
relationship".. The continuing relationship is said to "require[s] specialised judges who 
* 
l 
Legal Advisor, New Zealand Employers' Federation. The views expressed are those of the writer, 
not the Federation. 
Richardson, Sir lvor (1987) The role of the courts in industrial relations New Zealandjo.urna.l of 
industrial relaJions 12 (2) :113-118. 
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become steeped in Lhe field and who work wilh_ those !rom union and em~loyer ranks.2 
City professionals removed from commerce m1ght th1~k .that, bu~ fro~t-~t?e managers, 
marketers and supervisors know there is usually a "conl.lnu1ng relationship 1n ~omr:'.erce, 
just as with staff. While lawyers and oth~r protessio.nals make contracts , plat~ CIUzens 
do deals . The difference is a deal's on-gomg nature 1n contrast to the snapshot Ideal of a 
contract. Nonetheless, traditional courts of general jurisdiction do look to black-letter law 
to resolve contractual snap-shots of such continuing deals. 
So what, if anything, is it about employment courts which means ~hey should., or are 
better equipped to, take a uniquely "continuing" vievl of employment d1sputes? 
(a) The training of employment Court judges does not especially fit them for resolving 
employment. disputes from a ''continuing relationship" viewpoint. Their training is 
similar to that of general jurisdiction judges. 3 
(b) Indusuial parties do not bring employment disputes to employment courts to get 
"continuing" decisions. Just as Jane and John Citizen bring their gripes to conventional 
civil courts to get a ruling on ,a problem which they can't sort out themselves, not (pace 
the popular penchant for everyone to 'counsel', and 'mediate') to get wide-ranging advice -
still less, God forbid, decisions - on their "continuing relationships". 
(c) Deciding on continuing relationships gives the imaginative, aggressive disputant scope 
to manipulate t.he court as an active weapon in rea1-life relationship4 
(d) His Honour refers to the lay members who used to sit with the judges on the 
Arbitration Court. In their submissions on the Labour Relations Bill, employers 
protested the tendency sometimes perceived of conciliation by the Court and adjudication 
by the conciliators, insisting that the Court was there to adjudicate disputes (of right), 
not to arbitrate or mediate or conciliate. 
(e) Lay advocates in employment courts bring a penumbra of union or employer views, in 
addition to legal argument. Sometimes when the prime parties' dispute has shal]) 
collective significance (especially ideological or tactical), the union and employer central 
organisations are attracted, which is provided for in the statute. 
(f) Plain citizens in dispute with one another know that no third party could ever 
understand fully the real ramifications of their "continuing felationships". That is why 
they bring, not their relationship for counselling, but t.heir dispute for adjudication. 
The unique strength and prime function of any court lies in its use of adversarial trial 
procedures to bring forth facts through evidenoe publicly examined on oath, to advance 
arguments of statute and case law, to apply those to the tested facts, and to then sift all 
that with unbiased critical logic to arrive at a legal decision on the evidenced facts which is 
2 
3 
4 
This view is common. For ~example, it is repeated in Vranken and Hince~ 1987 which also 
refers to comments of the Minister of Labour, the Hon. Stan Rodger, during the second reading 
o~ the 1986 Bill, reported in The Dominion, 13 May 1987, p.2, "that buying and selling labour 
d1d not amount to just another ,economic market . . . [it] had an additional element, namely the 
need tor a continuing working relationship between the buyers and sellers .. 
Only one general jurisdiction speciality • the Pamily Court engages in particular training in 
sens~tising lhe judiciary to human felalionships. Ironically, it. probably has more w do with 
relauonships which are dis- continuing, than continuing ! 
Family Court parties are a Piime example. Employment courts can be another. 
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consistent with prior similar cases. That the decision as to liability should be of strict 
legal rationality, in no way runs counter to the application of a remedy which accords 
with "equity and good conscience". For the black letter mentality to prevail to the point 
of liability, then to be overtaken by equitable remedies, seems a desirable attitude for 
courts of both employment and general jursidiction. So ·employment disputes and courts 
~e not inherently unique vis-a-vis general legal problems and fora. Quite the contrary. 
"large employers with their greater economic power'' 
It is surprising to see such a hoary chestnut fall from such a height Large employers 
have great ~economic power, but so do large unions. And large employers are also very 
vulnerable - and in ways and to degrees that large unions are not ~rimarily because of 
their privileged position of de facto compulsory union membership). There is no general, 
overwhelming advantage to employers. Often the contrary is true. 
"may even destroy effective unionism."' 
The phrase~~~ effective unionism" begs a vast nun1ber of questions. If used to justify strike 
action as the countervailing power to employers' "greater economic power", it is quite 
inadequate. Damaging as strik~es are, they simply do not balance the fundamental 
employer power which comes from the employers fundamental function of organising 
satisfaction of consumer wants. The r,eal cost of strikes is that they poison the worker-
employer felationship in favour of the aggrandisement of more ren1ote union officials' 
power, and r,educe the shar~eholders' and employer's confidence which in turn inhibits 
investm,ent and so reduces available jobs. 
"Effective unionism" has nothing to do with strikes over inflating wage rate demands or 
unproductive manning levels, but rather the very sharpest critical analysis of management 
competence and board of director vision in conceiving and developing new products and 
services, in getting the most cost-productive plant, in putting together the most 
imaginative and risk-proof financing deals. Effective unionism in that sense would be a 
top-flight blend of investigativ~e journalism, technological commentary, and broker's 
backroom financial analysis, aimed firndy at demanding capitalist excellence from the 
cusl.Odians of ~capital. 
The Baking Trades v ,General Foods6 .interim injunction 
The dissenting view in this case was that because the Arbitration Court ·was a specialist 
employment Court, employment disputes should frrst be litigated fully in it before finding 
their limited way to any collateral or superior Court Until that route was first exhausted, 
there was no jurisdiction in the High Court to issue injunctions in labour disputes covered 
by the Industrial Relations Act. That view is quoted sel~ectively ad nauseam both by 
5 
6 
Typically, large ,employers are heavily capitalised employers. High capital/labour ratios are 
generally desirable becase the more the dollar backing-per-arm, the greater productivity and 
chance for profit. But conversely, high fix.ed capital investment is a hostage to the union 
activist. Pressure on the firm's windpipe cuts off the oxygen of its cash-flow, leaving it to 
choke on the sludge of its overheads, particularly its loan servicing costs. 
New aaland Baking Trades Employees JUW v General Foods Corporation (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 
NZLR 110. 
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learned counsel and opportunistic activists. This paper provides a timely opportunity to 
state a contrary argument. 
Firstly, the Industrial Relations Act never was a code governing employment. Acts that 
are codes have a simple means of statin~ Sf?.7 . The I~dustrial Relati~ns Act did not. so 
state. Its silence should be taken as clear Ind1cauon against such a drastic and far-reach1ng 
inference, which would exclude (by mere inference) sev~eral, and some powerful, 
jurisdictions and remedies. Secondly, if the Indus~al ~elations Act w~s int~nded ~o 
preclude conventional injunctions, interim or otherwtse, It could have satd so, tf not 1n 
1973, then in any of the frequent amendments. After aJJ, the employment court set up by 
the Industrial Relations Act was explicitly stated to be a Court of record, 8 and despite the 
surprising characterisation of it as an "inferior court" in His Honour's Quality Pizzas 
judgment9, it is respectfully submitted that the learned Williamson,]. 's riposte in 
Greenwich 1 Ois the better analysis and reasoningll. ThirdJy, it is argued that the employer 
shouldn't use interlocutory or interim injunctions in employment disputes because in 
practice such a decision usually determines the ultimate decision - the parties don't return 
lO litigate the final substantive issue. Why not ? After all, the union sees the strike as an 
interim weapon to another, ultimate goal, which doesn't appear as the JegaJ issue for 
reasoned decision in the Court.l2Founhly and most importantly, the question created by 
7 
8 
9 
e.g. Crimes Act 1961, ss.9,11 and the Criminal Code Act 1893. 
Industrial Relations Act 1973, s.32. 
lDlreponed~ CA 17/83 
10 [1983] ACJ 965 pp. 979-981 
11 
12 
It should be noted that neither judgment invokes or discusses the concept of inherent jurisdiction 
or power, or refers to the article on that topic by M.aster I.H.Jacob in Current Legal Problems 
1970, 23, and approved by the Court of Appeal in Taylor vA-G [1975] 2 NZLR 138. 
The argwnent against injunctions in employment matters rests on the traditional reluctance of 
courts to give equitable remedies which amount to specific performance of a contraC't for 
personal services, partly on grounds of social policy and partly on the argument that the Court 
does not have po"'er to actually enforce the carrying out of the personal services themselves 
(only to punish for contempt of a ~Court order). This view was overridden in some Canadian 
cases- (Winnipeg Builders Exchange v OperaJive Plasterers & ,CemenJ Masons International 
Association (1964) 48 DLR (2.d) 173, Manitoba CA, 3 JJ; Winnipeg Builders' Exchange v 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union (1966) 57 DLR (2.d) 141, 
Manitoba CA, 3JJ.; Prince Albert Pulp Co. Ltd. v Davidson (1970) 14 DLR (3d) 509, 
Saskatchewan CA, 3JJ .)- where the employers and the union had incorporated into their 
collective employment contract a 'peace clause'. The Courts there said that if the parties had 
entered into such a negative covenant with open eyes (citing Do.herty v Allman (1878), 3 
App.Cas.709 at 720, Lord Cairns, LC), there was no reason why the Courts should not enforce 
it by granting an injunction. 
It is respectfully suggested that the conventional judicial presumption of a blanket refusal to 
entertain specific performance of personal service agreements, is a judicial fiction when extended 
to collective agreements. Do judges really think employers negotiate collective agreements and 
settle the employment contract with the intention that the workers can withdraw their labour at 
will? This legal fiction sees employment from the union point of view (not the workers' nor 
lhe employer's). Granted that judges are now bound by tllis rule; but irs a chain of their own 
making, and one which is offensive to the commonsense of Lhe people who actually work at 
the workplace. Neither employer nor worker would, in general, enter into a contract of 
employment realistica)]y expecting to be able :to strike at wi11. If that was discussed at the 
engagement interview, and lhe worker insisted upon that righ~ it's a fair bet the worker would 
never get engaged. So the doctrine is a judicial gift to the unions. 
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His Honour was never an issue before the Court of Appeal. Exclusive Arbitration Court 
jurisdiction was argued initially in the High ~court (see p.ll of the pre-Report judgment) 
At the outset I accept Mr Colgan's submission lhat if this wer~e a case which involved 
truly what might be called the interpretation or application of industrial law then this 
Court ought not to embark. on an inquiry at all. 
But it was not argued in the Court of AppeaL 13 At the level of our highest local court, 
judicial courage should doubtless be welcomed; but it should fly on the wings of counsels' 
argument. Imagination alone should be expressed in seminars, conferences, or articles, 
rather than from the Bench on a case of specific facts. 
A feature of the employment court's jurisdiction was the discretion to hear the central 
organisations. 14 Central organisations have no such statutory rights of discretionary 
appearance in the ~Court of Appeal. His Honour himself actually over-rode one of the very 
features of the Act whose general pre-eminence he sought to promote.15 His Honour's 
dissenting judgment was truly obiter dictum . Be~ore the 1987 Act, the courts of general 
jurisdiction had a clear power (and duty) to entertain injunction proceedings in industrial, 
no less than other, matters. The conventional Courts' reluctance to deal with industrial 
injunctions was viewed by ~employers at best with puzzlement.16 
The Baking Trades case's twin forces of (a) apparent general judicial reluctance to order 
injunctions to stop strikes which were not lawful, and (b) His Honour's argument for prior 
jurisdiction of the employment court, led to a common view that Industrial Relations Act 
section 48 (2) (d) co.mpliance orders needed first to be attempted and exhausted in the 
Arbitration Court before High Court injunctions were sought. That was unfortunate for 
two reasons: 
(a) I believe it was :mistaken. The High Court would issue injunctions in industrial 
disputes if the strict criteria were carefully met and proven; and (b) In practice, the 
Arbitration Court proceedings were notoriously slow compared to the commercial 
13 I sat through the two days of the case and cannot recall the point being in issue. Indeed, 
'Thorp,J. states -
The question whether the Industrial Relations Act 1973 gave the Arbitration Court 
exclusive jurisdiction in industrial disputes ... was not at .any stage before the ~Court in 
these proceedings because both counsel for the appellants accepted that the Act did not have 
that effecL 
~One of the counsel accepted the High Court had a "last resort" jurisdiction; the other union 
counsel "did not contend that injunctions had no place in industrial law''. 
14 Explicitly recognised in both statutes. 
15 And that merely tlu:ough the inference of a privative interpr~etation of jurisdiction of a power not 
addressed at all in the said Act, namely injunctions. 
16 And at worst by the most outspoken and less inform.ed employers as bias, which in n1ore 
ex·treme comment was phrased as a fear of decisions with political overtones. Since union 
voices expressed the opposite view on the rare occasions that injunctions were won by 
employers, one can feel sympathy for the judiciary caught between the rock and the hard places 
of involved public opinion. Yet that is ultimately the nature of their job - the reason for their 
judicial immunity from suit 
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requirement ~or speed 1 7. It can be seen that i~ .widely ?eld. employer opinion, the 
dissenting judgment was unjustified judicial acUv1sm, which rron1cally overlooked a 
crucial factor inherent in its own argument, and which generated a great deal of both 
strategic and tactical disadvantage for employers f~ced wi~ declarations ~f industrial 
warfare. Perhaps the real wonder of it aU is the union surprise and expressions of hurt 
when they accuse employers of recently becoming "aggressive" 
~Gordon Anderson - Reception of economic t,orts into New Zealand labour 
law18 
The author reveals early a fundamental sympathy for the view that "the industrial relations 
system" is sufficiently important to desrve protection by legislation to survive19. Since 
there is no present likelihood of the industrial relations system not doing so, it may be 
presumed that means that trade unions especially deserve such protection. Anderson does 
not test the respective rights protected or threatened20 by "the intrusion of the common 
law", but it may be presumed that it is individual rights that ar~e protected, and collective 
rights that we threatened. E·mployers do generally support such common law "intrusion" 
simply because they believe individual rights ar,e fundarnental. I suspect Anderson may 
not shaJie that predisposition. 
Employers acknowledge the common law to be based "on individual, property-based 
values and on a particular notion of freedom of contract" (p. 95).. But that 
acknowledgment of an assumption is not, per se , a "flaw both in principle and in fact", or 
"a facade", as Anderson asserts. Still less is it an "attack[ on] the concept of democratic 
government". There is at least an arguable case that de-regulated commercial markets are 
more "democratic" and ~equitable than some of our merely political institutions of 
government, with their party-coagulated interests which have a propensity to trade off real 
equities in one social sector (e.g consumers' household economies through high personal 
17 Even when urgency was determined upon. the sheer fewness and geographical concentration of 
that Court's judges compared to the larg~e numbers ,and dispersion of High Court judges meant 
that 24-hour or less re~onses were virtually impossible. So the unions usually could wring 
out a t:ew more days' strike action, and the employer was left to cany losses for a further time. 
The argument that damages could be sought was often hollow, f:or unions wer~e frequently 
"unions of straw", or alternatively very strong. concentrated unions could simply repeat the 
damage - this time over the temerity of the ~employer in trying to seek those damages. 
l8 Anderson, ~G (1987).The reception of the economic torts into New Zealand labour law: a 
preliminary discussion New Zealand journal of industrial relalions 12 (2) :89-100 
l9 "Until recently the major intervention by statute was intended to protect the industrial relations 
system from the potentially tkvastating intrusion of the common law."- p.92 (my emphasis).) 
While the industrial relations system is often useful to production economics, a threat that 
something might "devastate" it, by itself, does not persuade 'that that 'something' is therefore 
bad, or even worse that the pr,esent industrial relations system and its derivative 'industrial 
relations club' of academics (like Anderson) and interest-group advocates (like myself) therefore 
needs sustaining. 
20 
If Anderson wants to argue the superiority of political institutions over markets, that's fme, and 
a contribution on that point of JX>litical philosophy would be awaited with interest. But if his 
purpose is to persuade those of us who share the widely-known and openly-acknowledged basic 
assumption of common law (that it is individually- and property-based) that we ar~e wrong in 
asserting common law superiority to "poHtical" law, lhen il is logically not suf:ficient for him 
merely to state that assumption. It is not sufficient to lea.ve the argument at that point with a 
rhetoricaJ question as to the appropriateness in the New Zealand context ~of "incorporating these 
attitudes." 
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income tax) against perceived equities in others (e.g universal, non-tested welfare benefits), 
to the ultimate damage of equity in both.21 
Anderson characterises the failure of the Ocean Beach prosecutions as a "debacle", as 
though the criminal sanctions failed because they were inherently ineffective in indusLriaJ 
relations. This is not so. The sanctions failed to proceed because prosecutions w,ere in 
the hands of the Labour Department, and there was not the political 22will to press 
multiple individual charg~es.23 It is to be noted that now there are civil, not criminal, 
remedies; and the suit lies at the initiative of a party, for example the employer. 
Litigation will be on the calculation of lhe individual party; the commercial, not the 
political, values will predominate.24 Where employers cannot recover commercial losses 
by strike action from unions, the new de-regulated commercial environment and the 
floating exchange rate will together mean, firstly that competition will lessen the 
suffering company's market share, and secondly that diversion or relocation of investn1ent 
overseas will become more attractive or even a matter of survivaJ.25 
Economic torts were not ever actually "outside the mainstrearn of labour law in New 
Zealand". Such economic damage was usually able to be absorbed by companies 
supplying the local markets in the cost-plus pricing policies 'vhich then obtained.26 27 
The economics torts were always part of the mainstream of law (if not labour law) in 
New Zealand; it was just that cross-subsidisation, \velfarism and protectionism diverted the 
stream into an ox-bow for about 40 years. With der~egulation and the return of market 
21 Man to Man, Sir Thomas Skinner, pp.l 46-9. 
22 Had all the defendants been involved in a riot causing extensive property dan1age, or sotne large-
scale affray involving assaults or multiple sexual connection, one could be sure the criminal 
process would not have been politically interfered with. Had the Ocean Beach prosecutions been 
in the hands of the company, it might hav,e been a different question. The significant thing is 
23 
that the Ocean Beach prosecutions were with lhc Depar1ment of Labourr. 
Employers are awwe of that (e.g. Ford v Northern Stor,epersons, cited by Anderson), as are the 
FOL also (e.g. Ken Douglas's comp1aint1 Evening Post 24 Noven1ber 1987).. Employers who 
suffer gratuitous and illegal hann arc no longer going to absorb those losses. They are going to 
recover them where appropriate. Further, it is arguable that the Companies Act. Amendn1ent 
1982, which put increased reponsibi1i'ties on directors and company officers, actually requires 
such steps from officers of limited liability corporations. 
Consumers are now telling employers through the market-place 'that they must now no longer 
tolerate intransigent union head-banging attacks to advance the interests of only one of several 
factors of production. 
25 That export companies1 that is ov,erseas consumers and customers, would eventually rebel seems 
not to have been realised, despite freezing companies' and farm,ers' despairing warnings. 
Ev,entually, the presence of the real wolf on export markets irnpinged. New Zealand's 
international competitive position dropped from 2nd to 25th. So much for those with faith that 
politicians, rather than competitive markets. should determine a counLry's balance of po"'er of 
26 
Tl 
its production and consuming factors '! 
Also, there was a long period starting with World War IT and the subsequent "full employment", 
when it was generally viewed as unacceptable for patriotic, humanist, socially sensitive, or 
simply ipolitical', reasons to seek legal ,compensation for economic dan1age suffered in 
industrial disputes. 
It was the welfarism and protectionism which was out of step, not economic torts. The 
welfarist mentality and the protectionist economy blinkered and blanketed New Zealanders fron1 
world market realities. Economic torts are a civilised, legal response to the harsher realities of 
lost contracts and markets which can follow upon persistent industrial relations anarchy,. 
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economics, labour law itself has returned to the mainstream of general law. 28The thesis 
that there had been an (unqualified) "legislative policy ... that industrial disputes should be 
settled by a specialist court" was never expressed legislative policy at all: there were 
always some areas in which the employment court did not have jurisdiction, I ~eaving them 
by default to the traditional common law courts, and there was probably also always an 
area of overlap.29 That is stiU the situation.30 .. Torts not specified in section 242 are still 
available to found actions in the traditional High ~Court,31 and personal grievance actions 
are not available to persons who are not members of a trade union at the time of filing 
their grievance 32. Of course there must still be jurisdiction in the traditional Courts for 
relief from such wrongs. Industrial law, unlike some other divisions of law which have 
been codified, is historically too young, and developing too continuously, to be 
successfully codified. When certain areas of it do become clearly seen, the legislature has 
seen fit to give exclusive responsibility for those areas to the specialist ~court The rest is 
best left open, lest relief tor some wrongs be inadvertently precluded. 
The present Act has separated off the arbitral functions of the previous court to an 
Arbitration Commission, and (largely) removed the tripartite worker and employer 
representation on the Bench. This is a clear indication to the Labour Court judiciary that 
the legislation wants thetn to get on with the business of adjudicating on employment 
disputes as the parties pfesent the cases and on the agreements the parties have actually 
reached. It frees the judiciary from the contradictory role previously asked of it, that it be 
some inappropriate mix of conciliator, mediator, and policy interpreter, in addition to and 
in the process of actually being an adjudicator. Given this, unions should not be surprised 
at the increasing so-called 'legalism' of the employment court. 33 
John Hughes .. Damages in econo.mic lorts34 
"It may be that the ·Government, which must surely have been mindful of the detrimental 
ef1ect of substantial awards against unions on the overaJJ ,effectiveness of industrial courts, 
" 
••• 
Why should the effectiveness of industrial courts depend on substantial awards not being 
made against unions ? The implicit answer is that if the Labour Court punishes the 
unions for breaking the law as severely as would a traditional Court dispensing black-letter 
law against 35 employers then unions may refuse to take their industrial business to an 
28 
That was the folk wisdom of industrial relations for many years. It was interpreted by some to 
mean that only the specialist court should settle industrial disputes. 
29 The Rodney Harrison/John Haigh lravellling New ZealandLaw Society seminar. 
30 
A point presently being tested in the High Court by Fletcher Construction Ltd.'s $10 ·m. 
damages action against lhe Northetn Labourers Union and officials. 
31 As John Haigh correctly poin'ls out. 
32 
Again, Ken Douglas, Evening Post, Tuesday, 2A November 1987 .. 
33 In this context, IR folk lore usually refers to the high dudgeon of the FOL at Blair.)·. 's "nil 
wage order". 
34 
Hughes, J (1987) Damages in the economic torts New Zealand journal of industrial relations 12 
(2) : 1 01-1 05 .. 
35 
Very revealing! It is certainly true that a few years ago one could hear that comment from 
em~loy.ers and lh~ir ~dvi.sors. Before 1984, the industrial relations system's conflation of Court 
arb1tratJon and adJUdJcalJon was seen as requiring sensitivity from employers not to be too hard 
cont. over. 
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employment court. What about the business under industrial attack ? The post-1984 
attitude is that that business is going to try hard to recover compensation ~or its wounds. 
After 1987, it has some marginally clearer tools to use in a court which is both familiar 
and historically acceptable to the offender - tools such as the more explicit compliance 
order, the injunction and the economic torts. 
Martin Vranken - Applicabillty of common law in industrial relations36 
Vranken's thesis is that "the con1mon law" (and he has in rnind particularly dan1agcs 
actions for strikes) "is inappropriate in dealing with industrial action". His reason is that 
"it risks jeopardising the very concept of the social autonon1y of industrial lavl." The 
fallacy is the assumption of "the social autonomy of industrial law". En1ployment la\v 
is not uniquely different from conventional law, as is often c1airned37 Frorn the business 
point of view, the consumer is para,mount; business is the agent of the consumer's 
satisfaction and the employer the personality of the business; and labour is but one input 
to the business in providing consumer satisfaction. The notion that industrial law is 
unique proceeds fro1n the reverse order of priorities : the population collectively must., 
for humanist reasons, consu,me (eat, shelter, clothe, war1n); consu1nption requires 
purchasing power, both for worker-consumers and for the producing business (to move the 
inventory - the Keynesian '~effective aggregate demand' thesis); purchasing power con1cs 
from remuneration; remuneration requires employment; so ag&rregate consumption requires 
collective employmenr.38 Industrial law disciplines the employment environn1cnt 
collectively, and so is unique amongst laws in that it is essentially collective. Employers 
reject that notion. It is the satisfaction of consumer demand which generates the demand 
for labour and employment. In any ~event, to argue that collective employn1ent 
relationships are paramount as shown by the collective jurisdjction of the Labour Court is 
circular : the Labour Court was constituted to deal with collective relationships.39 It is 
the statute that makes them unique: not vice versa.40 41 
on the unions. And some employers thought "suing the pants off' an errant union \\'as being 
too hard. (Cp. Haigh's article, p.ll9 : " ... but its use in the past has been voluntarily curtailed 
by employers themselves.") But that attitude has substantially changed since the radical de-
regulation of 1984 and afterwards. Etnployers now no longer have the cushions of cross-
subsidisation. The true costs of various actions taken against a firm are now more clearly and 
more quickly seen - by management themselves, and by Lhe owners and Lhe financial analysts 
who judge the managers. The possible range of success and failure has been tremendously 
widened : the very good succeed excellently; but lhe mediocre and the soft touch stick out like 
sore thumbs. 
36 Vrankin, M (1987) The applicability of lhe common law in an industrial relations context (with 
special reference to industrial action): a comment New Zealand journal of industrial relalions 12 
(2) :107-112. 
37 See earlier analysis of the Richardson,}. article. 
38 The core of the attitude of the CSU's econon1ist, Peter Harris. 
39 Within labour collectivities. and between them and employers. both collectively and to son1e 
extent individually (personal grievances). 
40 Industrial relations are not inherently unique just because behind the collective metaphor there 
are many individuals relating industriously to many employers. Collective industrial relations 
and law is .an accidenJal consequence , not a necessary inherenl characteristic and cause of. the 
41 
n1any employment relationships. 
The argun1ent that industrial law is, or should be, .. socially autonon1ous" only holds if one 
believes that the abstract meta-notion of collectivities is more real than its elements. That is, 
cont. over. 
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John Haigh -l¥i// industrial relations survil'e the Labour Relations Act 
1987 ?42 
Haigh answers "yes". SpccificalJy, "Compliance orders will supersede injunctions as the 
most effective remedy 'tO prevent ongoing breaches of industrial awards or agreements." If 
''most effective" means rnost numerous, I agree. The procedure is not as technical, and so 
is n1ore easily accessible to a \vider range of advocates on both sides. It may be that a 
cornpliance order is only really effective because it is backed up by the mysterious 
"Injunction" \vhich strikcth frorn heaven like a lighLning bo1t, and the awful "Damages In 
Economic Tort" suit which can crush the wicked with a burden which robs them of all 
their financial Enna-G for years to come. Black hun1our 43 aside, the effectiveness of the 
compliance order is in part due to its being seen by boisterous unions as a lesser and less 
aggressive rernedy; and thus sornewhat more acceptable to them.44 
All of this goes back to the earlier Hughes thesis that the effectiveness of the Court 
depends on the "acceptance" of the unions of the ren1edies meted out There has been the 
feeling that if the Court applied the full sanction of the law rigorously, the unions would 
cease to bring their grievances to the Court and would instead "hit the bricks", which is 
taken as clearly not "improving" [1973 Act] and not furthering "the orderly conduct" of 
( 1987 Act] good industrial relations. It is even thought it could also lead to the demise of 
the Labour Court as an institution.45 That view over-rates the power and relevance of 
unions in their present role and attitudes. lf the unions choose not to use the Labour 
Court, employers still could. If union officials defy Labour Court judgments, the unions 
could face conternpt and sequestration orders. If the Labour Court judges refuse to punish 
that 'effective aggregate de:rnand' is move real than a purchase of a loaf of bread; that a firm's 
'workers' is n1ore real Lhan Sam Browne on the packing belt and Jane Smith in the office of the 
forge. It hinges on one's socio-political disposition towards individualism or collectivism. 
En1ployers prefer individualism, whose ex post facto collectivity is the "market"'. By ex post 
facto is meant that the market does not do things. Rather, it is simply an expression for the 
collective effect of all tl1e individuals in a particular aspect of their behaviour, afterwards. The 
'markef is a dependent, not an independent, concept. Talk of the market 'doing' something, such 
as constraining consun1er alternatives, or 'failing', is metaphorical. It may provide seminal 
insight, but it is not analysis.] 
42 
Haigh, J (1987) lndustrial relations: will they survive the Labour Relations Act 1987 ? New 
Zealandjournal of industrial relations 12 (2) :119-121. 
43 
Humour seems auracted to t11e topic of injunctions. Hom,CJ complained of suffering from 
"injuncti vilis"; and the abstract to Haigh's paper states "that the heyday of the use of un junctions 
in industrial law has been and gone." However, the science of industrial relations awaits its 
44 
45 
Charles Dodgson yet. 
If an employer wishes to vlam a union in a tone of medium severity, it files a compliance order; 
(if it is more serious, it files an injunction or tort; and if if it is totally exasperated, it hangs a 
damages clain1 on the injunction or tort). After all, the days or weeks it can take to get a 
compliance order to Court gives grace for a goodly strike - no swift lightning bolt there; and 
no damages can be a\varded under the compliance order - no crushing weight of punishment 
there. 
Indeed, some employers, unionists, and lawyers have speculated just that as a result of the 1987 
Acl, saying that : the injunctions and damages actions are too technical, alienating the non-
legally-trained advocates; the injunctions and damages are too effectively punitive; the loss of 
n1e1nber's representing worker-employer interests tneans unions no longer feel they have a 
'f:iend' a.L Court; the unions can put prompter and n1ore effective pressure on unions through 
drrecl actton. 
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for disobedience of their orders, there could be appeals or proceedings for review of those 
decisions in the Court of Appeat.46 The 'acceptability' of the Labour Court to one or 
other collectivity is not critical once the Court is instituted. The Labour Court only 
exists derivatively to assist the prior reality of grouped industrial relationships - without 
its exclusive jurisdiction, it is not inherently necessary. The sam~e is Lrue of the unions 
themselves. They too are derivative, serving the prior r~ealities of employment, business 
organisation, and consumer demand. If there were no unions, there \VOuld still 
nonetheless be workers working for employers to satisfy consumer needs. The truth is 
that the unions need the Labour Court more than it needs them. The Court is a major 
source of legitirnisation of the existence of industrial unionism. 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987 
Infancy 
It is too early to assess definitively the progress of the Act. There have been many 
instances of great caution, both judicial and administrative, as is to be expected wilh a new 
Act.47 However, despite the changes to the statute, to the Court structure and to Court 
personnel 48 , the IR system today is still made up substantially of the same union 
officials, company industrial staff, and central organisation advisors as it was before 
August 1987,. Most of the law before that date continues to be relevant.49 
Teething ~troubles 
(a) Pliocedure : statement of de1ence 
Unlike conventional Courts, no statement of defence is required to be filed by a defendant 
or respondent. This not infrequently leads to defence by an1bush. The Labour Court is a 
civil court; it should be looking to the spirit of the the High Court con1n1ercial list as a 
model of requiring promptness and openness from the parties. A start would be to require 
reply statements 'vhich go beyond mere denial of clairns and which indicate the 
respondent's view of the issues, where those differ from the applicant's staternent of claim. 
(b) Chameleon strikes slide from unlawful to lawful cause 
Consider an employer who is bound by a registered award, is struck outside of the 60 days 
of the award's expiry, with a clai:m for a special allowance. After trying to contact, and 
then reason with the elusive union secretary, the employer contacts his advisors who tell 
him his primary remedy under the Act (s. 186(f)) is a compliance order. So the employer 
46 Indeed, ev,en if unions decided on a \Vholesale policy of industrjal warfare, there are still 
businesses that must go on and workers who must eal and consumers who will den1and 
satisfaction of their needs. 
47 The question of the possibility of ex parte injunctions and e0mpliance orders is one ~example 
(the judgment is still awaited from the November 1987 case before the Full ,Court); the 
administrative anxiety casued by the early flood of compliance order applications is another. 
48 Creating the Arbitration Commission. 
49 And so not surprisingly the attitudes underlying the conm1ents in the articles in the New Zealand 
journal of industrial relations of August 1987 seem still to persist substantially. Hence this 
paper's criticism of those attitudes and suggestion of an alternative view. 
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files a compliance order application in Court That same afternoon the employer receives 
a fax from the union's lawyer, which reads (in part) : 
As of 2.00 pm today, the union withdraws its strike action for the teaspoon allowance 
of $5.00 per week. 
As of 2.05 pm today, members of this union, the ABC IUOW and of two others, the 
PQR.IUOW and the XYZ.IA.OW, employed by your firm are on strike in support of 
a composite agreement, full details of the claims of whi~h will. be forwar,~ed to you 
soon. Meanwhile, we advise that one of those clatms w11l be for tncreased 
remuneration of $5.00 per week teaspoon allowance. 
Second (or subsequent) level bargaining is alive and well. 
(c) Is a compliance order really "the primary remedy for a breach"? 
Tvvo unions have a chronic demarcation dispute history. An employer is in a vulnerable 
industry, or at a vulnerable time. The first union strikes for an agreement to secure to 
itself all of the disputed work at that employer. The employer's crop will spoil in 3 days; 
or the last export ship or flight arriving pre-Christmas in London leaves in 3 days; (or 
whatever). Even with urgency, the queue of cases means it takes 2 weeks to get a 
compliance order application betore the Court- or one week for an injunction. This is not 
a commercial response time. Worse, there is some evidence, and a general belief, that the 
Court administration favours a certain creative delay in letting such applications get heard 
be Core a Judge. "Things work themselves out", a little strike massage is inevitable and 
there£ore acceptable, it eases the Court's case load. This is not acceptable administration. 
Actually, notwithstanding section 186 (f) and section 230 (e), ·mediation is really perceived 
as the "primary" remedy for disputes, even of non-compliance. But what incentive is there 
on the union to attend urgent mediation (which cannot punish non-attendance}, when the 
enforcement of the mediation procedure is still remote in tirne ? Why not wring out a few 
1nore days' industrial pressure ? 
In the Fletcher Construction v Northern Labourerers Union compliance order case 50, the 
Judge held that the evidence was that the cause of the strike by members of the Labourers 
Union against their contractor-employers (not Fletchers) by refusing delivery of only 
Fletchers materials (cement, timber, steel) on to Auckland sites, was a demarcation dispute 
betweeen labourers and engineers over rigging down at Kawerau. The applicants were not 
'the employers of the strikers; so no compliance order could issue at their suit. The strike 
was "reprehensible", but the Court could offer no compliance order remedy. This was 
exactly the situation of secondary industrial action for which the Employers Federation 
pleaded ~or femedies in subn1issions to the 1986 Labour Relations Bill. 
In the same case, the Judge refered to the Bay Milk case51 in which he refused a 
compliance order application over breach of award through failing to follow disputes 
procedure, on the ground that "since the demarcation was about to be heard. . . . a 
compliance order could have pre-judged the larger issue ... ". With respect, it is not 
imm~diately obvio~s why the imminent hearing of a demarcation dispute should over-ride 
sanct1 ty ~f the. requrreme~t _agreed upon by the parties to follow set procedures to resolve 
demarcauon dtsputes. If u IS that demarcation is a "larger issue" than following resolution 
50 WLC 4/88, 1. January. 1988. 
51 WLC 2188, 15 January 19~8. 
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procedure, one cannot but ask how a judge52 can rank a particular dispute of a class of 
disputes as "larger" than a procedure to deal with all examples of that class. Surely 
procedure is "larger" than a particular substance; and that a Judge must labour to achieve 
particular substantive justice within general prcx>edures.53 54 
The Long Tille of the 1987 Act refers to "orderly conduct of" and the 1973 Act to 
"improving, industrial relations?". If a judicial belief that a union or a group of \\'Orkers 
may continue to feel aggrieved and continue industrial action in this or another strike, 
which is clearly not" good industrial relations", is sufficient ground for a judge to decide 
not to rnake a judgment enforcing some particular discretionary rernedy of the Act, then 
employers state strongly that they believe that adhering to procedures in statute or agreed 
by the parties is also, and more fundamental I y, good industrial relations. Whether unions 
like that or not, or will continue a specific strike, is subordinate to such sanctity of 
agreement. 55 It should be remembered that e.mployers can have "equity" on their side, too. 
It is hard to believe that the discretion not to issue the compliance order should have been 
exercised on the grounds of the ·mere existence of another simultaneous cause. 
If a union calls a strike of so1ne of its ·members, within 60 days of expiry of its award, 
over two issues, one lawful (say, the r·e-negotiation of its award) and a one unlawful (say, 
a demarcation dispute), can (should? would?) the Court issue a compliance order? This 
question exposes the conceptual problem of multiple causes of industrial action where the 
Act expects only single causes. The Court might strive to delv~e into the facts of each 
case so as to separate some workers' striking over (say) redundancy from other workers' 
sttiking over the disputes of interest. Yet there will, at tin1es, be fact situations with 
genuinely joint strike issues, one lawful and one unlawful. Will the Court interpret the 
Act to give priority to continuation of work or to bargaining leverage? The ans\ver to be 
given by the Court will be read by practitioners as a policy judgement akin to 
legislation.A small step towards a solution might be to consider requiring strikers to give 
\Vritten reasons for a strike., with the proviso that where those reasons ar~e sho\vn not to 
properly identify all the relevant reasons, the strike thereby becomes unlawful. "Reasons 
for a strike" would redress a present imbalance between strikes and lockouts. Lockouts, in 
order to justify non-payment of wages, require an employer to lay son1e demand on the 
workers 56 If section 233 were amended in that way, it would require a party taking 
industrial action to provide identification of all the causes of, and thus reasons for, the 
dispute, which \vould in itself be a major step towards resolving it. It would also provide 
the Court with reliable evidence upon which to discriminate between lawful and unlawful 
action 57 58(However, it is acknowledged that the usual problems of evasion and evidence 
52 Of all professions. 
53 Whatever 'fix-it' attitude may be though appropriate to the role of mediator. 
54 Grover v Southland Engineering showed that 'equity and good conscience' ~exists within. and is 
disciplined by, 'the statute. 
55 After aU, the logic of lhe contrary vi~ew is that if employers were correspondingly cavalier 
towards their statutory duties and industrial agreements, the Court would not grant unions 
discretionary remedies in case employers may feel aggrieved and continue some industrial 
action, for example a lockout. ''Good industrial relations'' is a t\vo-way street \vhich includes 
adherence to agreed procedtrres. 
56 (s.232(1) : '' ... ·with a view 'to compelling ... ; and New Zealand Engine Drivers etc JUOVl v 
Gear MeaJ Processing Ltd AC 42/82). 
57 If the amendment added the phrase ''and only if' after the first "if", it would sett]e the present 
grey question of the legality of strikes \•lhich are neither lawful under s.233 nor unlawful under 
cont. over. 
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exist for unions detennined to avoid such provisions.) Identification and evidencing the 
policy an1biguity as to \vork continuation and bargai~ing_ leverage, does not ~f . .itself 
resolve the contradiction. Ernployers want a clear legtslative statement that striking or 
locking out over i1nminent re-negotiations of a dispute of .interest is Ia:vf~l on/~ when 
that is the only issue in dispute. Confusion with other 1ssues should d1squahfy that 
protection. 
Conclusion 
Industrial relations theorists have for many years cast industrial relations in a framework 
of personified classes, workers and employers, whose relations are predicated upon 
conflict. The so-called 'unitary model' ("let's all bake a bigger cake", "we're all in it 
together'') has been represented as 'pollyanna'. Instead, ern players' and workers' different 
goals have been treated as equally valid (when 'worker' values haven't actually 
predominated). The following suggests a different view which is believed to re'flect better 
business opinion of priori ties. The reason there are any jobs at all, whether in 
e:mployment or contracting, is that some people called ''consumers" want, and are 
prepared. to pay for, some goods or services. Such work is the only reason for jobs. All 
other so-called 'work' is disguised welfare. It is the function (not the 'right'; but rather the 
'duty') of management to rneet consumer demand, and to do so as efficiently and effectively 
as possible. One of the vlays for management to meet consumer demand is to organise 
labour productively and strengthen its .muscle and mind with capital and motivation. 
Two inferences can be drawn Firstly, management goals/duties are socially more 
fundamental than those of work~ers, because they are more totally and immediately related 
to satisfying consumers. Secondly, and as a corollary, unions would have more leverage 
wiU1 manage1nent if they identified 1neans of satisfying consumers which are superior to 
current management practice (because mangemenCs clients would then support the 
workers), than by interfering with consumer satisfaction by interruptions. At present, any 
apparent union gains frorn industrial action are usua1Iy Pyrrhic. 
Strikes ahnost al\vays ultimately cost workers more than employers, since management 
has the general support of owners on wider issues above and beyond employment, and can 
often, in the medium term, rernove the employment from Ne·w Zealand or transfonu it to 
minimise strike affects. \\1here strike damage cannot be avoided or minimised, the service 
itself becomes run down or rnade non-competitive or both. The im.mediate effect of that is 
that future jobs are not created, and present jobs are threatened. While not striking will 
not create employment (that's a different problem), strikes white-ant e.mployment.59 The 
more open New Zealand's econon1y, the more de-regulated its markets, then the more 
essential is union leadership which irnproves its members' remuneration and conditions by 
rnaking suggestions on manage.ment and direction \Vhich are better than the present 
58 
s.234. Strikes would only be lawful if reasons wer·e stated and confirmed in writin.g : without 
lhat minimum, strikes would be unlawful, removing an elemenl of present ambiguity. That 
would parallel the effect of ''with a view to compelling'' in s.232 - ''Definition of lockout"'. 
e.g. ~oml?are Small's evidence on collateral 'fix-it' demands at p.ll ofF ell ex v .New Zealand 
Engtneenng, and Northern Distribuirion, Unions LC.70/87 and Williarnson.J.'s quoting of New 
Zealand Engineering IVO~\' v New Zealand.A1C Ltd. [1983] ACJ 73, in Air New Zealand Ltd v 
New. Zealand Air .Line Pilots Association JUO\V LC 22/87, p.l4 (re comment on ARA v 
PublLc Passenger 1 rw~port Workers). 
S9 ~trikers are simply head-hangers- their own! A union encouraging strikes simply encourages 
lls rnen1bcrs' self-abuse : it hits them in their pockets. 
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practices of management and boards. That requires a totally new attitude in unionism. 
Workers might hire as union officers, some of the very brightest graduates and some very 
experienced technicians. These people would analyse and comrncnt. They probably 
wouldnit stay long with the unions (but so what ?); and the best of them might sec 
critiqueing employer performance for a union as a good "shop window" for demonstrating 
their executive potential. Effective, incisive union officials of that stripe would be 
snapped up as managers and directors as just the sort of entrepreneurial go-getters O\•lners 
of capital would want to manage their enterprises. The spin-off is that unions then have 
some of "their own" in the ranks of 1nanagen1ent. The breakdown of industrial apartheid 
is begun. 60 In such a co,mpetitive, innovative, mobile environment, hO\V much need do 
you think there would be for a (opportunity-)costly seminar such as this on "Strikes and 
the Labour Court: the Injunction and Compliance Order Provisions ... "? 
60 Some unionists seem to have becon1e bogged down in totally the wrong job. Their energies, 
insights, drive and visions have been drowned in the mediocrity of union politics and polemics. 
What a waste that no-one had hauled them out of the morass and set them to 1nanaging 
sornct.hing - they could have been getting paid lo create, instead of depress, jobs. 
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